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INTRODUCTION
The practice of using intellectual property' as collateral to
secure financing is over a century old: in the late 1880s Thomas
Edison used his patent to the incandescent electric light as collateral
to borrow money to start his own company.2 That business would
eventually become the General Electric Company.3 Similarly, the
problems associated with trying to obtain financing on the basis of
intellectual property are not new. Lenders, seeking to minimize
their exposure to risk, have historically been hesitant to lend money
on the security of intellectual property, instead preferring more
traditional, tangible collateral such as land, buildings, and equip-
ment.
4
Recently, however, commercial lenders, already reluctant to lend
on the basis of intellectual property, are being further deterred by
t B.S. 1993, Atlantic Union College; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Jerry Lewis for his thoughtful substantive
feedback, myLawReview colleagues for their careful editing and helpful suggestions,
and my family, especially my parents, for their constant support of my academic
pursuits. This Comment is dedicated with love to my wife Catrina, for whose
unwavering support and encouragement I will always be grateful.
' The term "intellectual property" in this Comment refers to patents, trademarks
subject to federal statutes, and copyrights. Other types of intellectual property, such
as trade secrets, may also be used as collateral in secured financing, but will not be
addressed in this Comment because such transactions are regulated exclusively by
state law. Mask works, a type of intellectual property relating to computer circuitry,
also will not be discussed because it is clear that federal statutory regulation provides
for federal recordation of security interests. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2 See ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON AND THE BUSINESS OF INNOVATION 43-46 (1990).
3 See id. at 130.
4 See Murray Oxby, The High-Tech Rut: Knowledge- and Expertise-Based Firms
Struggle Against Low-Risk Bank Culture, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 21, 1994 (describing
how banks continue to struggle with the notion of financing the intellectual property
asset), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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the confusion surrounding the proper method of perfecting5 a
security interest6 in intellectual property. Parties who wish to use
intellectual property as collateral are faced with a host of questions
to which the answers are unclear: To perfect a security interest,
must a lender record according to state law, federal law, or both?
How is priority among competing creditors determined? Does a
lender who takes a security interest in intellectual property expose
itself to infringement liability? Can a lender take and perfect a
security interest in the debtor's after-acquired property? The
current state of the law does not answer these questions with the
clarity and certainty needed to foster growth of investment in
information and technological assets.
Foremost among these problems is whether federal or state law
governs the parties' rights. Both the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC or the Code)7 and the relevant federal statutes' arguably
control the creation of security interests in patents,9 copyrights,1"
' Perfection is the process by which a secured party's security interest in a debtor's
collateral is protected against competing claims to the collateral by third parties. For
an overview of how a secured party perfects its security interest in a debtor's
collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code system, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD &
THOMAS H. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 66-76 (2d ed.
1987). Perfection of a security interest is essential because if it is not perfected, the
secured party may lose its claim to the secured property as against judgment lien
creditors, the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding, or other third party creditors
claiming an interest in such property. See id. at 67-68.
6 In general, perfection of a security interest is accomplished by filing a financing
statement with the appropriate state agency. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 9-401 (1994).
When intellectual property is involved, however, federal statutes may govern and
provide for national registration and a different place of filing. See BAIRD &JACKSON,
supra note 5, at 153-54; see also infra part II.B.
7 Article 9 of the UCC governs the creation of security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
101 to 9-507.
8 The applicable federal statutes for the perfection of patents, trademarks, and
copyrights are the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), respectively.
' A patent may be obtained to protect the inventor or discoverer of"any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Patent protection is available
only through federal registration and provides the patent holder with the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell the invention throughout the United States for a period
of 17 years. See § 154.
" Copyright protection is afforded to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). This includes, but is not
limited to (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
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and trademarks." It is presently unclear, however, to what extent
federal regulations preempt the UCC in a particular secured
transaction.
A number of recent judicial decisions attempt to clarify these
issues and establish a system of perfection, 2 but many significant
questions remain unanswered. Creditors fear that the current legal
framework will not consistently recognize their efforts to safeguard
security interests in intellectual property as collateral. This un-
certainty must be resolved to enhance the utilization of intellectual
property as collateral in financing transactions.
This Comment argues that federal law should govern security
interests in intellectual property. It will become clear that a single,
uniform law will best meet the goals of both commercial credit and
intellectual property law. It is important, however, to bear in mind
that the question of which law should govern is a separate question
from what that law should look like. Thus, this Comment will also
works. See § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Copyright protection does not extend,
however, to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery." § 102(b).
Although federal registration of a copyright is not mandatory, doing so affords
the copyright holder three significant advantages: (1) early registration is prima facie
proof of the validity of the copyright, see § 410(c); (2) for works of United States
origin, registration is a prerequisite to an infringement action, see § 411(a); and (3)
statutory damages and attorney's fees may be awarded only if registration is made
prior to infringement, see § 412. Because of these advantages, lenders usually require
copyright registration before taking a security interest in such property.
" A trademark
includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1)
used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). A trademark is protectable whether or not it is federally
registered under the Lanham Act. Federal registration, however, offers significant
procedural and substantive advantages similar to those afforded copyrights. See
§§ 1111-1126 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12 See, e.g., Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG
Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that a security
interest in copyrights to films must be perfected through recordation of such security
interest with the U.S. Copyright Office), aff'd, 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir. 1993); National
Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.) 116 B.R. 194, 199 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that
perfection of security interests in copyrights is governed by federal registration rules,
not the UCC); Creditors' Comm. of TR-3 Indus., Inc. v. Capital Bank (rn re TR-3
Industries), 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that a security interest
in trademarks must be perfected in accordance with Article 9 of the UCC, not the
Lanham Act).
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argue that federal law should be improved, so that the uniform law
being applied will also be the optimal substantive law.
This Comment begins, in Part I, with an exploration of the value
of intellectual property and the events that have led to the increased
recognition and use of intellectual property as collateral in financing
transactions. Part II contains a review of the relevant state and
federal statutes and thejudicial decisions interpreting those statutes.
It concludes with an analysis of how the current practice of dual
filing at both the state and federal levels, established in response to
these judicial decisions, is both diminishing the value of intellectual
property in financing transactions and deterring lenders from
accepting intellectual property as collateral.
Part III provides an in-depth analysis and criticism of the "mixed
perfection" approach that is currently advocated as the best method
of reform. Part IV proposes that a wholly federal system of
perfection is a preferable approach because such a system is more
consistent with the nature of intellectual property and recognizes
federal interests that are not adequately addressed by either a
wholly state or mixed perfection approach. This Comment
concludes by exploring the optimal substantive law which should be
adopted under a uniform federal system.
I. THE INCREASING RECOGNITION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AS A VALUABLE ASSET
Intellectual property used to be the tail that failed to wag the dog in
commercial transactions. Now it is the dog itself'3
The value of intellectual property has risen substantially in
recent years, to the point where, in many instances, a company's
intellectual property is now far more valuable than its real property.
As a result, intellectual property has earned recognition as the
dominant factor behind many recent commercial transactions.
14
As the value of intellectual property has risen, so has the value
of having intellectual property available for financing purposes. In
a small, emerging growth corporation, for example, trademarks may
represent as much as eighty percent of a company's value. 15 In
such corporations, the availability of intellectual property for use as
collateral may represent the only means by which that company can
" Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial Transactions,
10 ENT. & SPORTS L. 5, 5 (1992).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
'5 See Simensky, supra note 13, at 5.
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obtain financing for the promotion and development of new ideas
and products.
The stakes for large corporations are also extremely high. The
value of intellectual property for large corporations with established,
name-recognizable products can run into the billions of dollars.
Consider the Marlboro cigarette. One in four cigarettes sold in the
United States is a Marlboro cigarette, and the estimated worth of
the Marlboro trademark is $40 billion worldwide.1 6 The ability to
tap such a resource for financing purposes is extraordinarily
valuable.
Modern companies are well aware of the importance and value
of their intellectual property. The 1991 Annual Report of the
Campbell Soup Company reveals the significance that modem
businesses place on their intellectual property:
Campbell owns a mighty array of proven brands-brands like
"Pepperidge Farm," "UG," "Franco-American," "Vlasic," "Swanson"
... and "Campbell's" itself. They provide an asset bank to fund
global expansion.... In the coming years we will launch brand
line extensions and new products and expand into new distribu-
tion channels and new geography.
7
The recognition of intellectual property as an extremely valuable
asset is the result of several recent, concurrent developments.
Intellectual property law has changed radically since the inception
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" (CAFC) on
October 1, 1982. The CAFC was established primarily to settle the
law in dozens of areas where various adjudications in regional
appellate courts had created a morass of conflicting standards.
1 9
The CAFC has consistently resolved these disputes in favor of the
patent owner,21 which has made the patent a much more stable
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) provides a single forum
for all appeals arising from patent disputes, regardless of where in the United States
they arise. See Daniel B. Moskowitz, Patent Owners Gaining Clout, WASH. POST, July
15, 1985, at F7.
19 See id.
" See id. Prior to the establishment of the CAFC, patents were upheld in favor
of the patent owner approximately only 30% of the time. The CAFC, however, has
upheld patents in favor of the patent owner approximately 70% of the time. See
Randall W. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the Proper Scope
of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 n.7 (1991)
(citing statistics regarding the CAFC).
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and valuable business asset.21 Financiers, in turn, are increasingly
willing to consider a patent as collateral for funds they desire to
lend.
22
Another development leading to the recent increase in recogni-
tion of the value of intellectual property is the unprecedented
mergers and acquisitions activity of the 1980s. This activity
contributed greatly to a heightened awareness of the need to value
accurately a corporation's intellectual property assets. "Intellectual
property is fast becoming the most important asset possessed by
corporations. Various forms of intellectual property are the
foundation of market dominance and continuing profitability for
many companies. Very often they are the prized target in mergers
and acquisitions."
21
An example is the acquisition of the Pillsbury Company by
Grand Metropolitan of Great Britain for $5.7 billion. In obtaining
Pillsbury, Grand Metropolitan's primary purpose was to acquire
such powerful brands as Burger King, Green Giant, and Hiiagen-
Dazs.24 Similarly, Nestle paid $4.5 billion to obtain the Rowntree
corporation 25 and acquire brands such as Rollo, Kit Kat, and After
Eight.2 6 Such deals heightened awareness throughout the business
community of the value of intellectual property.
The extremely high failure rate of new brands, coupled with the
exorbitant costs of introducing them into the marketplace, has also
enhanced perceptions of the value of established trademarks. The
domestic introduction of a new brand of soap, for example, costs
approximately $100 million. With ten thousand new products
introduced annually, eighty percent of them destined to fail and
fewer than one percent ever obtaining annual sales of $15 mil-
21 See Moskowitz, supra note 18, at F7.
' See id.
25 GORDON V. SMIH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS at vii (1989).
24 See Simensky, supra note 13, at 5.
25 See The Purest Treasure, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1991, at 67. The $4.5 billion price
tag represented nearly five times the book value of the Rowntree corporation. See id.
26 See Mark Maremont & John Templeman, How Much Chocolate Can the Swiss
Devour?, BUS. WK., May 9, 1988, at 64 (discussing popular brands at stake in the deal).
" See Simensky, supra note 13, at 5 (noting the high cost of promoting new
brands). The more sophisticated the product being introduced, the more dramatic
the rise in investment costs. For example, the pharmaceutical industry estimates that,
on average, it invests 10 years and between $125 and $160 million to introduce a new
product. See John H. Bliss, Counterfeiting in the Information Age: A Global Threat to
Intellectual Property Protection, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 12, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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lion,28 it is easy to recognize why established brands are extremely
valuable.
29
The importance for companies to have intellectual property
available for use as collateral in financing transactions has grown in
conjunction with the increased value and recognition of intellectual
property. The current state of the law, however, diminishes the
value of intellectual property and deters lenders from accepting it
as collateral.
II. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF LAW DETERS THE USE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL
To create an unassailable security interest in the borrower's
intellectual property, the lender and its counsel are advised to
follow four basic steps: (1) exercise "due diligence" by searching
the appropriate federal and state offices to determine the title,
ownership, and status of the intellectual property; (2) negotiate a
separate security agreement for the intellectual property serving as
collateral for the loan and include clauses regarding the representa-
tions, warranties, and other terms relating to intellectual property;
(3) obtain a letter of opinion from the borrower's intellectual
property counsel regarding the status of the intellectual property
collateral, thereby supporting the borrower's representations and
warranties; and (4) perfect the security interest by recording it in
the appropriate government office or offices.
30
It is the fourth step which currently presents the most difficulty.
The UCC and the federal statutes disagree as to the proper method
28 See Simensky, supra note 13, at 5. There are also several years of heavy
promotion costs associated with new products. See id.
' Further evidence of the increased recognition of the value of intellectual
property as an asset has been its internationalization via multinational trade
agreements. See id. at 6. Prior to 1986, intellectual property was not even covered
by major trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). See id. Today, intellectual property considerations often play a dominant
role in trade negotiations. Industrialized nations attempt to condition the opening
of their markets to other countries upon their citizens' intellectual property rights.
See id. These changed perceptions of the commercial value of intellectual property
were revealed through trade sanctions imposed by the United States on China in early
1995 for China's failure to provide copyright and other legal protection for music,
movies, software, and other imported U.S. products. See Robert Hurtado, With
Sanctions Set, Companies Rethink Their China Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at Al, D2.
Recent studies estimate that product counterfeiting has cost the United States
economy $200 billion and that 750,000jobs have been lost due to foreign counterfeit-
ing of U.S. products. See Bliss, supra note 27.
" See Simensky, supra note 13, at 7-8.
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of perfecting a security interest in intellectual property. Although
both set out rules regarding perfection, neither the UCC nor the
federal statutes specifically displace the other,1 and judicial
decisions have not firmly established which body of law controls.
3 2
As a result, secured parties lack consistent, stable law to ensure
sufficient protection of their security interests in intellectual
property.33
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
1. Method of Perfection
Article 9 of the UCC is designed to comprehensively regulate
consensual secured transactions involving personal property as
collateral. 4 Under Article 9, a debtor who grants a security
interest in personal property retains an ownership interest in the
secured property. The debtor retains the right to transfer its
ownership rights in the collateral, 5 but the transferee must take
the collateral subject to any perfected security interest.3 6 It is of
paramount importance to the lender to be assured that its security
interest in the collateral is properly perfected so that the lender will
be protected against future holders of the intellectual property.
The UCC provides that security interests in general intangibles,
3 7
which include patents, trademarks, and copyrights," may be
"1 See MichaelJ. Dunne & Elizabeth A. Barba, Securingan Interest in Intangibles, 131
N.J. L.J. 1274, 1274 (1992) ("Since the inception of the code, there has been no
definitive answer to whether the federal copyright, patent, and trademark laws pre-
empt the UCC with regard to the perfection or priority of security interests in such
property.").
" See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent case law
on whether federal statutes preempt the UCC).
" As mentioned above, there is a critical difference between the proper choice of
law and the optimal substance of that law. Although this Comment argues that
federal law is the proper choice of law, it will become apparent that federal law
should be modified to look more like the UCC as a matter of substantive law.
' "This article sets out a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security
interests in personal property and fixtures." U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1994). But see id.
§ 9-104 (listing various transactions excluded from Article 9).
' See id. § 9-311 ("The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred .... ").
' See id. § 9-306(2) (providing that "a security interest continues notwithstanding
sale, exchange or other disposition thereof").
" See id. § 9-106 ("'General intangibles' means any personal property.., other
than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money.").
' See id. § 9-106 cmt. ("[E]xamples [of general intangibles] are copyrights,
trademarks and patents .... ").
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perfected by filing a financing statement 9 with the proper state
authorities.
40
Whether the UCC applies to a particular transaction, however,
is a separate inquiry. The UCC incorporates voluntary fallback
provisions that render the UCC inapplicable when the parties'
substantive rights are governed by federal statutes, 41 or when a
federal statute provides for a national system of registration or
specifies a place of filing different from that designated by Article
9 of the UCC. 42  At first blush, these fallback provisions would
seem to answer the question of whether federal or state law will
govern the transaction. In interpreting the law, however, courts
have generally found that the federal statute will only govern if the
court determines that the federal statute was enacted with the intent
of regulating secured transactions involving the intellectual property
at issue. 43  Thus, courts usually find that federal preemption
applies only to security interests in copyrights and patents,"4 while
trademarks remain under the domain of state regulation.45 The
" The financing statement is a simple document meant to convey basic
information for the benefit of interested third parties. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra
note 5, at 189 (stating that the financing statement "exists to aid third parties"); see
also U.C.C. § 9-402 (listing the formal requirements of the financing statement).
See U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (indicating which state's law governs the perfection of
security interests in general intangibles); id. § 9-401 (setting forth the proper place
to file in order to perfect a security interest).
41 See id. § 9-104(a). "Where a federal statute regulates the incidents of security
interests in particular types of property, those security interests are of course
governed by the federal statutes and excluded from this Article." Id. § 9-104(a) cmt.
1. For further discussion of the UCC fall-back provisions, see generally BAIRD &
JACKSON, supra note 5 at 153-64 (discussing exclusions from the UCC based on
federal statues).
42 See id. § 9-302(3) (noting that the filing of a financing statement is not
"necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to (a) a statute
or treaty of the United States which provides for a national or international
registration ... or which specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this
Article.").
41 See; e.g., TR-3 Industries, Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Industries), 41 B.R.
128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that state law did not control because "[i]t
was not the purpose or intent of Congress in enacting the Lanham Act to provide a
method for the perfection of security interests in trademarks").
"' See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 204 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding
that perfection of security interests in copyrights and patents are governed by federal
registration rules, not the UCC); see also Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v.
Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 40 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1991) (concluding that security interest in copyrights to films must be perfected
through federal registration of such security interest), afffd, 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir.
1993).
"' This result arises primarily from interpretation of the Official Comment to § 9-
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dissimilar treatment of trademarks as compared to copyrights and
patents appears unwarranted given the similarity of trademarks to
patents and copyrights.
2. Treatment of After-Acquired Property and Proceeds
Parties to a secured transaction often wish to have their security
agreement cover not only the initially enumerated property, but also
future proceeds of that property46 and related after-acquired
property.4 7 The UCC facilitates such agreements by providing that
a creditor may retain a "continuously perfected security interest if
the interest in the original collateral was perfected."" The UCC
also allows a creditor to create a security interest in all identifiable
proceeds flowing from the borrower's intellectual property49 and
in any after-acquired or after-developed intellectual property, if
provided for in the security agreement." Following these provi-
sions generally assures both parties to a secured transaction that,
once the original financing statement is properly perfected through
recordation in the appropriate state office, the perfected security
interest applies to the enumerated property as well as to its future
proceeds and related after-acquired property.51
104 of the UCC which states: "the Federal Copyright Act contains provisions
permitting the mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an assignment of a
copyright .... The filing provisions under these [Copyright and Patent] Acts... are
recognized as the equivalent to filing under this Article." U.C.C § 9-104(a) cmt. 1
(citations omitted).
The Official Comment's lack of any reference to trademarks has typically been
interpreted to "suggest that the drafters ... were of the opinion that the reference
to 'assignments' in the Lanham Act did not embrace security interests." Roman
Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R.
940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), af/'d, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
46 See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (defining proceeds as "whatever is received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds").
" The term "after-acquired property" refers generally to property that is created
or acquired by the debtor after the encumbrance of the initial property. See BAIRD
& JACKSON, supra note 5 at 35-36.
48 U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
49 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) ("[A] security interest ... continues in any identifiable
proceeds ... received by the debtor.").
' U.C.C. § 9-204 provides that "a security agreement may provide that any or all
obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral." Id. § 9-204(1). A "security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired
property clause has equal status with a security interest in collateral in which the
debtor has rights at the time value is given under the security agreement." Id. § 9-204
cmt. 1.
" See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and
Information Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. LJ. 195, 224 (1987) (describing the ease
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3. Priority of Competing Creditors
Secured collateral is often subject to competing claims of
multiple creditors.52 To resolve such claims, the UCC employs a
first-to-file or -perfect rule to establish priority of creditors." This
system allows the lender to determine whether, as of the date the
search is conducted, any other secured party of record has priority.
Thus, a lender must search and file only once to obtain the
protection it seeks.
B. The Federal Statutes
The federal statutes governing intellectual property embody a
highly divergent concept of personal property security and a very
different legal framework for secured financing than that set forth
in the UCC.54 Unlike the UCC method of taking a security interest
in property retained by the debtor, federal law approaches the
problem of securing a debt in intellectual property as one of
transferring title to the intellectual property from the debtor to the
creditor. For example, a collateral assignment of a patent is
generally accomplished by vesting title in the assignee, subject to
defeasance through reassignment to the assignor after repayment of
the debt.5 Unlike the UCC system, the federal statutes do not
enable the debtor to retain any power to transfer its rights in
collateral subject to the security interest; rather, the creditor, being
the title holder, may transfer title subject to defeasance upon
repayment of the debt.
The federal approach to secured transactions is fundamentally
different from the more familiar UCC. Because it is presently
with which after-acquired property and future proceeds may be encumbered under
the UCC).
52 See U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 1 ("In a variety of situations two or more people may
claim an interest in the same property.... [This section] contains rules for
determining priorities between security interests . .. ").
53 See id. § 9-312(5) ("[P]riority between conflicting security interests in the same
collateral shall be determined according to... priority in time of filing or perfection.
Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or the time
the security is first perfected, whichever is earlier . . ").
For an example of how these concepts diverge in practice, see Harold R.
Weinberg & WilliamJ. Woodward,Jr., Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactions
in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 KY. LJ. 61, 63 n.3 (1990).
55 See PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.01(2) (2d ed. 1994).
Security rights in a trademark are created by entering into a conditional assignment
that passes title in the event of the assignor-debtor's default. See id.
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unclear whether the federal or state system controls, cautious
lenders file on both the state and federal levels to assure perfec-
tion.-6 As is explored in greater detail below, however, this "dual
filing" approach does little to alleviate lenders' fears that they will
become subject to the federal statutes' priority and after-acquired
property schemes or, worse yet, liable in an infringement action.
7
This fear and uncertainty destroys the value of intellectual property
as collateral in secured financing transactions.
1. Methods of Perfection
a. Copyrights
Of the federal statutes regulating intellectual property, the
Copyright Act presently contains the clearest structure regarding
perfection of traditional security interests. Any "assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license or ... other conveyance"58 creating a
present, future, or potential relationship between the parties is to
be considered a transfer of copyright ownership59 that may be
recorded in the copyright office. 60 These provisions allow for a
security interest structured such that an assignment of the copyright
depends upon the occurrence of a contingency (such as default on
loan payments) agreed upon by the parties and set out in the
agreement.
Unfortunately, lenders wishing to protect their security interest
in copyrights by filing on the federal level are faced with further
difficulty; the Copyright Act requires that any document filed with
the Copyright Office must be done in a manner that "specifically
identif[ies] the work to which [that document] pertains."6 Conse-
quently, a lender wishing to take a security interest in a borrower's
copyright must file individually against each copyright. "Where the
property involves frequent and important changes (such as in
software development), the creditor is faced with substantial
See Gary D. Samson, Scope of Article 9, in INTRODUCTION TO SECURED
TRANSACTIONS AND LETTERS OF CREDIT 1991: UCC ARTICLES 9 AND 5, at 137, 149
(advising lenders to avoid risk by complying with both federal laws and the UCC when
seeking to perfect security interests).
5 See infra part II.C.
58 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
'9 See 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(a)(2) (1993).
o See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) ("Any transfer of copyright ownership or other docu-
ments pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office ...
61 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1).
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compliance costs and encounters clear risks of incomplete or
unattempted conveyances which may inhibit the use of intellectual
property as collateral."62
b. Patents
The Patent Act also contains recordation provisions that seem
to favor federal preemption of the UCC. Perfection of security
interests in patents, however, is far less clear than perfection of
security interests in copyrights. Unlike the Copyright Act, the
Patent Act does not specifically provide for the recordation of a
"mortgage ... or hypothecation."" Instead, the Patent Act
provides for mandatory recordation of "assignments, grants and
other conveyances" of patents.64 Furthermore, the Patent Act
indicates that "[a]n assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable
consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the
date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage."6 5
A mortgage is a nonabsolute assignment form of a security
interest.66 Unlike the Copyright Act, however, the Patent Act does
not specifically mention mortgages. As a result it is presently
unclear whether filing under the Patent Act is sufficient to perfect
a security interest that is not in the form of an absolute assignment.
The case law on the issue, which is entirely inconsistent, further
adds to the confusion. The court in Holt v. United States67 held
that, because a conditional security interest does not involve an
actual transfer of title, a federal patent filing did not apply to a
security interest in a patent application. This analysis suggests that
all security interests in patents are governed by Article 9 of the UCC
and can only be perfected through filing in the appropriate state
office. Other courts have followed this approach, finding that a
conditional security interest does not fall under the Patent Act
because it is not a true assignment of title, thus rendering a filing
solely on the federal level insufficient for perfection.6"
62 Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 51, at 225.
"17 U.S.C. § 101; see also supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (defining a
transfer of copyright ownership).
"35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
6Id.
6See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "mortgage").
61 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 336 (D.D.C. 1973).
' See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 784 (D. Kan. 1988)
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Reaching the opposite conclusion, however, the court in In re
Otto Fabric Co. 9 did not find the transfer of title distinction
persuasive, holding instead that the federal Patent Act preempted
the UCC regarding the perfection of a security interest in patents.
The court found that a UCC filing was not sufficient because the
Patent Office maintained an "adequate filing system that entirely
preempts UCC filing."7" Under this analysis, the Patent Act
preempts the UCC regarding the perfection of security interests in
patents, thus rendering a filing solely on the state level insufficient
for perfection.7 1 These cases illustrate the profound uncertainty
in the current case law about how to perfect security interests in
patents.
c. Trademarks
Unlike the Copyright Act and possibly the Patent Act, the
Lanham Act does not, as presently interpreted, appear to preempt
state law with regard to perfecting security interests. The Lanham
Act expressly provides only for filing of an assignment of trademark,
which is not defined to include pledges, mortgages, or hypotheca-
tion of trademarks. 72 Furthermore, comment one to section 9-104
of the UCC does not mention the Lanham Act, as it does the
Copyright and Patent Acts, as being a federal statute that preempts
the Code.7' A typical creditor, however, does not seek an outright
(finding that federal filing was not required to perfect a security interest in patents
against a trustee in bankruptcy); In re Transportation Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R.
635, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that a UCC filing identifying a security
interest in a debtor's general intangibles was sufficient to defeat an interest of the
trustee in bankruptcy; however, the secured party would not be protected against a
debtor's transfer of title to the patent to a bona-fide purchaser who properly recorded
with the Patent and Trademark Office).
69 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985).
70 Id. at 657.
7 In dicta, the court in National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
of Denver (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 203-04 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1990), determined that perfection of security interests in patents is governed
solely in accordance with the Patent Act, rather than with the UCC. This decision
paralleled the court's holding that the Copyright Act preempted state law regarding
perfection of security interests in copyrights. Id. at 199. In so finding, the court
specifically rejected the contrary holdings in In re Transportation Design, 48 B.R. at
641, and City Bank & Trust, 83 B.R. at 783-84. See In re Peregrine Entertainment, 116
B.R. at 203-04.
15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988) ("A registered mark or a mark for which application
to register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business in
which the mark is used ....
" See supra note 45.
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assignment of the trademark,7 4 preferring instead a transfer
contingent on a condition such as default. Recognizing these
factors, courts usually find that any contingent transfer of trademark
rights is governed by the UCC, rather than the Lanham Act.
75
Therefore, it is generally thought that the only method of perfecting
a security interest in a trademark is to file a financing statement
with the appropriate state office, pursuant to the UCC provisions.
Even this general rule regarding trademarks, however, is subject
to great uncertainty. Neither the Patent Act nor the Lanham Act
expressly provides for registration of mortgages. 6 Both the Patent
Act and the Lanham Act reference assignments only, rather than
conditional security interests or mortgages. Despite this fact, at
least one court has determined that the Patent Act, but not the
Lanham Act, should preempt state law. 7 The substantial similarity
of the provisions of both acts, however, challenges this result.
' One option sometimes taken by a creditor is to accept an absolute assignment
of the trademark and then execute a license agreement with the borrower for use of
the trademark in the borrower's business. Such assignments may expose the lender,
as assignee, to liability for infringement. See Dunne & Barba, supra note 31, at 1307.
Furthermore, such an assignment may be deemed void as an assignment in gross if
the transfer is not accompanied by goodwill, rendering the trademark void because
the lender is not in the business associated with the trademark. See id.; see also
Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
A further problem is that the borrower-licensee, having divested itself of its
trademark ownership rights, only has the right to sue for infringement when its rights
are sufficiently analogous to ownership rights to confer standing. See 3 J.THoMAs
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32.02[7] (1992).
There is general agreement, however, that a truly exclusive licensee, who may exclude
even the licensor from using the mark, has standing to sue for infringement. See 3
id.
7' See Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that federal trademark law does not preempt the UCC
provisions for perfection of security interests, even though the Patent & Trademark
Office allows documents to be filed memorializing the grant of a security interest in
a trademark); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796-98 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1989) (finding that Article 9 of the UCC governs the perfection of security
interests in a trademark and holding that a UCC financing statement that did not
cover intangible assets was insufficient to perfect an interest in the debtor's
trademark); TR-3 Industries, Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Industries), 41 B.R. 128,
131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that, when a lender did not file with the Patent
and Trademark Office but did record a UCC statement indicating a security interest
in general intangibles, such security interest was appropriately perfected). But see T.S.
Note Co. v. United Kansas Bank & Trust (In re Topsy's Shoppes, Inc.), 131 B.R. 886
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (finding that UCC perfection of the creditor's interest in
general intangibles was insufficient to perfect a security interest in a debtor's
trademarks, copyrights, and franchise agreements).76 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67, 72.
" See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, no one can be sure whether a future court will come
to the conclusion that the Lanham Act also preempts state law.7
8
Because of this uncertainty surrounding the application of federal
and state law, careful lenders are forced to protect themselves by
recording their security interests in trademarks under both the UCC
and the Lanham Act.
C. The Excessive Costs and Deterrent Effects
of the Dual-Filing System
Because of the current uncertainty regarding federal preemption
of the UCC, most lenders that take security interests in intellectual
property employ an approach of dual filing and searching at both
the state and federal levels. As described above, a lender cannot
eliminate its potential exposure to federal regulation of its security
interest in the debtor's intellectual property. A lender facing the
possibility of having federal law control its security interest in
intellectual property is subject not only to great uncertainty, but
also to the high risks regarding after-acquired property, priority,
and exposure to potential liability posed by infringement suits.
Ultimately, the increased risks and unnecessary dual filing costs are
transferred to the borrower, thus decreasing the value of intellectual
property for financing purposes.
1. After-Acquired Property
Under the current federal system, lenders encounter serious
difficulties in attempting to establish a blanket lien allowing for the
automatic perfection of after-acquired property. For example, the
only proper method of filing a security interest under the Copyright
Act is to file a document that "specifically identifies the work to
which [such document] pertains."" In practice, the lender usually
"I See Dunne & Barba, supra note 31, at 1307 ("[I]n light of the similarity of the
Lanham Act to the patent laws it is questionable whether prior case law should be
relied upon by secured lenders.").
"' 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1)(1988). Neither the Patent Act nor the Lanham Act has
a provision allowing for the automatic encumbrance of after-acquired property.
A further consequence of the Copyright Act's requirement that the security
interest specifically identify the work that it covers is to force the lender, in order to
perform a complete and adequate search, to rely on the borrower. Searches for prior
encumbrances on a copyright are performed in the Copyright Office by the title or
registration of the copyright, rather than by debtor name. As a result, creditors are
left at a distinct disadvantage because they must rely on the debtor to inform them of
each copyright that the debtor owns or creates. Without this information, the search
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creates a collateral assignment requiring that subsequent property
be "conveyed" to the creditor. Although such provisions are
enforceable, they are problematic and expensive because they rely
upon the debtor to inform the creditor of any new acquisition"0
and require the lender to make multiple filings in order to maintain
its interest."1 The UCC, on the other hand, allows for easy encum-
brance of the products and proceeds of collateral through the
standard financing form.
2
The ability to establish a claim in after-acquired property is
often critical when dealing with intellectual property. To illustrate,
consider the situation of a lender who wishes to obtain a security
interest in the initial manuscript of a novel or the first version of a
computer software program. Such a lender may find its interest
unperfected as to the final product if the borrower, either negli-
gently or intentionally, fails to notify the lender of a new copyright
in the next version of the novel or software. Even if the lender files
against the new copyright, as is the current practice, the uncertainty
of perfection is not resolved because a bankruptcy court might void
the lender's perfected security interest as a preference.
83
will be inadequate.
8 See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 51, at 224-25.
81 See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 54, at 85. The authors note:
[T]he [federal] transactional approach involves considerably more expense
than the [UCC] notice filing approach because the transactional approach
involves multiple trips to the filing office, while notice filing requires only
one. Such expense ultimately falls on the borrower and decreases the value
of the [intellectual property collateral] for financing purposes.
Id.
d See U.C.C. § 9-306(3). Commentators have noted:
Article 9 provides for easy encumbering of after-acquired property in
commercial transactions. In most cases, a security agreement can include
after-acquired property by a simple reference to such property. No detailed
description is required. A financing statement covers after-acquired
property automatically. Even if the agreement does not expressly cover
after-acquired property, the U.C.C. gives a creditor rights in all proceeds of
its original collateral. This covers any property received on sale or other
disposition of the property ....
Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 51, at 224 (footnotes omitted); see also part II.A.2
(discussing the UCC's treatment of after-acquired property and proceeds).
' Dunne & Barba, supra note 31, at 1274 (describing a similar hypothetical
example and noting the possibility of a voidable preference). A preference is simply
a transfer made by the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy that favors one creditor over
another. See BAIRD &JACKSON, supra note 5, at 509. In general, any transfer made
by the debtor within ninety days of bankruptcy is subject to preference scrutiny, and
thus subject to possible voidance. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
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Under the current federal system, therefore, the lender is
exposed to considerable risk and expense when attempting to
establish a claim in after-acquired property. This risk and expense
is passed on to the debtor in the form of higher costs and interest
rates and, in some instances, the refusal of the lender to accept
intellectual property as collateral.
2. Priority
Another problem unique to the federal filing system is the
provision for priority among conflicting interests. Unlike the first-
to-file or -perfect rule of the UCC,84 the federal statutes provide
for various relate-back periods, allowing for the establishment of
priority on the basis of the date of execution of the agreement. For
instance, the Lanham Act provides that any trademark assignment
will be void as against any subsequent purchaser for value without
notice, unless the assignment is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months after the date of the
assignment or prior to the subsequent purchase.85 The Patent Act
similarly provides for a three-month relate-back period during which
the secured party may perfect its security interest and gain priority
over subsequent parties who may be unaware of the preexisting
lien.8" The Copyright Act also contains a relate-back period,
although it is somewhat less lenient, allowing only a one-month
period to register transfers executed in the United States.87
Although these priority rules do not affect whether or not an
assignment is properly perfected, they reduce lender confidence in
the results of searches regarding the ownership of the property.
88
8 See U.C.C. § 9-312(5); supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988).
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
87 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1988).
" The Ad Hoc Committee on Security Interests has commented on the outdated
priority rules of the federal system:
The existing federal intellectual property transfer recordal laws include
lengthy look-back or grace periods from the Pony Express era, when coast-
to-coast overnight courier services did not exist. The continued existence
of such periods obviously defeats the justified expectations of purchasers
and lenders that title and security interests relating to intellectual property
can be determined on a relatively current basis.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Security Interests of the ABA Section of Paten
Trademark and Copyright Law, in AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSAL FOR
REFORM 11, 11 (1992) [hereinafter Committee Report].
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL
This increased risk will also ultimately fall on the borrower, thereby
decreasing the value of intellectual property collateral for financing
purposes.
3. Exposure to Infringement Liability
Perhaps most frightening to a potential lender is the very real
possibility, under the current federal approach, of being found
liable in an infringement action. This possibility arises out of the
federal law's treatment of a security interest as a transfer of title
from the debtor to the creditor. s9 For example, under federal
patent law, conditional assignments of patents, once recorded, are
considered to be absolute assignments.9 " Such an absolute assign-
ment carries with it all of the rights associated with ownership,
including any negative rights. Consequently, lenders could find
themselves liable for infringement suits related to the secured
collateral." With recent jury verdicts for intellectual property
infringement reaching the $1 billion range, 2 lenders feel they
cannot afford to take the risk of being held liable in an infringe-
ment suit. This risk further diminishes the value of intellectual
property in financing transactions and serves as a disincentive to
lenders to lend on the basis of such collateral.
89 See supra text accompanying note 55.
o See 37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (1993) ("Assignments which are made conditional on the
performance of certain acts or events, such as the payment of money or other
condition subsequent, if recorded in the Office, are regarded as absolute assign-
ments .... ").
9 Under Article 9 of the UCC, "secured parties' exposure to ownership risks and
responsibilities such as infringement liability should be greatly reduced because a
security interest is not the same as title." Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 54, at
96.
' In 1991, Kodak Company agreed to pay Polaroid Corporation $925 million to
settle a decade-old court battle over Kodak's infringement of instant photography
patents held by Polaroid. The $925 million consisted of a patent infringement verdict
of $873 million plus $52 million in interest. See Kodak to Pay Polaroid $925 Million
to Settle Suit, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1991 at C13; see also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 876 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding that Kodak had infringed
11 patents held by Polaroid), affd 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 850 (1986).
More recently, in 1993, ajury awarded Litton Industries, Inc., a $1.2 billion
patent infringement verdict against Honeywell, Inc., for an airplane guidance device.
After a post-trial hearing, however, the court reversed the jury verdict, holding
Litton's patent "unenforceable because it was obtained by inequitable conduct" and
invalid because the technology involved was obvious. Thomas R. King,Judge Nullifies
Litton's $1.2 Billion Patent Victoiy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1995, at A2, A14.
1995] 1719
1720 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1701
III. THE MIXED PERFECTION APPROACH
In examining the current state of the law and the proposals for
reform, a solution should sufficiently recognize the policies and
interests of both the federal and state systems. The "mixed
perfection" approach, as described and analyzed below, attempts to
strike such a balance. However, because this approach is not
consistent with the goals and policies of commercial credit law and
fails to give proper recognition to strong federal policy interests, it
must be rejected in favor of a wholly federal system.
A. Development of the Mixed Perfection Approach
Predictability, uniformity, convenience, easy determination of
prior interests, protection of the rights of all interested parties, and
recognition of public policy concerns are overriding considerations
for a system of perfection,93 yet they currently are wholly lacking
in the arena of intellectual property financing. The current system
of law provides for national, federally regulated registration of a
lender's interest in copyrights.9 4 Trademarks, on the other hand,
appear to be controlled by state, UCC-regulated registration,
although there is serious uncertainty as to whether such state
registration alone is sufficient.95 Patents provide the least certain-
ty, with the current state of the law completely unclear as to
whether a state or federal registration alone is sufficient to perfect
a lender's interest.9 6
Recognizing the importance of resolving the current inconsis-
tencies in the law regulating perfection of security interests in
intellectual property, the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section
of the American Bar Association (ABA) established an Ad Hoc
Committee on Security Interests (Ad Hoc Committee) in 1989 to
analyze the problem and suggest possible solutions.9 7 The ABA's
Section of Business Law also contributed by organizing a Task Force
on Security Interests in Intellectual Property (Task Force) in
" See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199-200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)
(discussing the reasons underlying the recording requirements).
See supra part II.B.I.a (discussing perfection of copyrights).
5 See supra part II.B.I.c (discussing perfection of trademarks).
See supra part II.B.I.b (discussing perfection of patents).
97 See Committee Report, supra note 88, at 1.
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1990.98 Both the Ad Hoc Committee and the Task Force agreed
that the current state of the law was unsatisfactory and in need of
revision." As a result of their combined efforts, the Task Force
submitted a proposal to change the current system of laws regarding
security interests (Task Force Proposal).' In addition, the Article
9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code (Article 9 Committee) has recently
issued a report (Article 9 Report) discussing and making recommen-
dations regarding security interests in intellectual property regulat-
ed by federal law." 1
The proposals of the Task Force and the Article 9 Committee
address many of the same issues and make proposals which are
similar in many respects. Both proposals recommend the adoption
of a mixed perfection approach; however, the proposals differ with
regard to the detail of such approach. Because these proposals
represent the most serious efforts to date to reform the state of the
law, they will be considered in some detail below.
0 2
9 See Report of the ABA Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property, in
AMERICAN LAW INST. & AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 423 (1993) [hereinafter Task Force Proposal]. "Members
of the Task Force included representation from the various Business Law Section
committees relevant to the issues-Technology and Intellectual Property, Uniform
Commercial Code and Commercial Financial Services. In addition,. . . representa-
tives of various points of view, knowledgeable in different aspects of the problem,"
were consulted. Id. at 424.
09See Committee Report, supra note 88, at 2.
100 See Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 435-36.
10' See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT
OF THE ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITTEE 50-55 (1992) [hereinafter ARTICLE 9 REPORT].
The Article 9 Committee received substantial assistance from the Task Force on
Security Interests in Intellectual Property of the ABA Section on Business Law.
" In addition to the mixed approach discussed in this Part and the wholly federal
approach this Comment advocates, see infra part IV, a wholly state approach based on
the UCC might be considered. Such an approach, however, has been uniformly
rejected as unpractical because it would require Congressional abdication of the
federal government's role "with respect to uniformity in tracking interests" in
intellectual property financing rights. Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 429.
Under the analysis provided by this Comment, a wholly state approach would be
rejected due to its failure to recognize the federal interests discussed in Parts III and
IV.
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1. The Task Force Proposal
a. Perfection of Security Interests
In its proposal, the Task Force unanimously adopts a mixed
perfection approach which would coordinate federal and state
filings."10 Under this mixed approach, a lender is required to file
a UC financing statement against its borrower in accordance with
Article 9 in the applicable state or states."' In addition to the
state filing, the mixed approach requires the lender to file "a copy
of the [UCC financing statement] filed [with the state] with an
appropriate cover sheet" at the federal level and in accordance with
the Copyright Office or Patent and Trademark Office proce-
dure." 5 These financing documents would be filed in the federal
offices on the basis of the debtor's name, rather than according to
a description of the secured collateral.'
The Task Force recognizes that the mixed perfection approach
relies upon certain assumptions which it believes are attainable:
(a) that notice filing registries indexed by debtor name (preferably
only one registry, though it could be more) be established by the
[Patent and Trademark Office] and the Copyright Office; (b) that
the various "look-back" periods [found in the federal statutes] will
be eliminated or substantially reduced; (c) that secured parties will
be given the ability to file prior to federal registration and prior
to imposition of the security interest; and (d) that a filing would
apply to after-acquired property and proceeds.
10 7
The Task Force recommended that perfection of security
interests be accomplished solely through the Article 9 filing with the
appropriate state or states.' s Under this regime, a secured party's
failure to file at the federal level would not prevent perfection,
although it would subject the secured party to termination of its
rights through a subsequent sale or assignment of the collateral. 109
Furthermore, a filing solely on the federal level would not be
sufficient to establish perfection.' Thus, although the Task
10s See Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 435.
104 See id. at 431.
1051 d. at 436.
'06 See id. at 431.
1
0 7 Id. at 436.
108 See id. at 435.
,09 See id.
110 See id.
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Force approach creates a single, joint procedure to perfect security
interests in copyrights, patents, and trademarks, it still requires the
duplicative effort of filing two documents in order to effect that
security interest.
b. Priority of Competing Creditors
As noted above, the Task Force Proposal assumes that the various
"look-back" periods found in the federal statutes will be eliminated
or substantially changed with respect to priority among holders of
security interests. The Task Force believes, based upon its discus-
sions with the relevant federal offices, that substantially reducing or
eliminating the relate-back periods found in the federal statutes is
achievable."' Such change would allow the lender to quickly and
easily determine if prior interests in the collateral exist.
Under the mixed perfection approach, the state filing of the
UCC financing statement would establish a lender's priority interest
in the secured property as "against lien creditors, secured creditors
and all third parties other than subsequent purchasers/assignees for
value."" 2 The federal filing of the UC filing statement by
debtor's name would be necessary to establish priority over
subsequent purchasers and assignees for value.
113
c. Treatment of After-Acquired Property and Proceeds
The Task Force also assumes that the secured parties will be
given, in the federal offices, the ability to file a security interest in
after-acquired property and proceeds. Although the Task Force
Proposal does not specifically address how this assumption will be
turned into reality, it would flow directly from allowing a filing of
the UCC filing statement in the appropriate federal office. Such
filings would be indexed on a debtor-name basis, and "would not
require the lender specifically to identify the collateral."" 4 The
use of such a system would allow after-acquired, federally regulated
intellectual property to be included as collateral and be perfected
at the federal level, thus allowing for the establishment of a blanket
lien on such property.
" See id. at 436.
12 Id. at 435.
US See id.
n Thomas F. Smegal,Jr., Questions Persist on Security Interests, NAT'L L.J.,June 28,
1993, at 20, 22.
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2. The Article 9 Report
The Article 9 Committee recognized that the extent to which the
UCC governs security interests in federally regulated intellectual
property is uncertain. It also observed this uncertainty can only be
clarified if "[b]oth Article 9 and federal law [are] revised to make
clear the extent to which each governs the creation, perfection,
priority, and enforcement of security interests in federally regulated
intellectual property rights."11 5 Therefore, the Article 9 Commit-
tee made several recommendations for reform in each body of law.
a. The Federal Tract and Notice-Filing Recording Systems
With respect to reforms in the federal system, the Article 9
Committee recommends that "federal recording systems for
interests in intellectual property... be reformed to establish one
or more notice-filing systems for security interests."" 6 These
notice-filing systems would supplement the current federal "tract"
recording systems that are indexed according to particular proper-
ty.117 In other words, the Article 9 Committee supports using two
federal filing recording systems. The Article 9 Committee agrees
with the Task Force Proposal in its recommendation that the federal
notice filing system should be indexed according to the name of the
debtor and should permit the filing of a single document to cover
and perfect security interests in after-acquired, federally regulated
property and proceeds arising out of that property.118 Unlike the
Article 9 Committee, however, the Task Force stated that it
"strongly believes that permitting the preexisting 'tract' systems to
have a role in the priority system for security interests is a mistake
and a step backwards."" 9 The Task Force originally considered
such an approach (primarily because of the historical attachment to
such filing systems), but ultimately concluded that "such a tri-partite
system would be confusing and unhelpful."12
" ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101, at 50 (Recommendation A). The
Committee further notes that "the [UCC] Drafting Committee should revise § 9-
104(a) or the official comments to state that Article 9 applies to such security interests
to the extent permitted by the Constitution and should revise § 9-302(3) and the
official comment to clarify the applicability of the subsection." Id.1 16 Id. (Recommendation B).
117 See id.
18 See id. at 55.
119 Task Force Proposal, supra, note 98, at 436.
120 Id.
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b. Perfection of Security Interests
The Article 9 Committee disagrees with the Task Force as to the
appropriate method of perfection of a security interest. Although
the Task Force Proposal specifically urges that perfection of security
interests be accomplished only through a UCC filing,121 the Article
9 Committee recommends that "Article 9 and federal law should be
revised to provide that a security interest can be perfected ...
either in accordance with Article 9 or by recordation in the appropri-
ate federal tract index." 22 Recordation in the recommended
federal notice-filing system, however, would not "be necessary or
sufficient to perfect a security interest."1 2' The Task Force dis-
agrees with the Article 9 Committee proposal that a secured party
should be allowed to choose between a federal and state filing for
purposes of perfection. 1
24
c. Priority of Competing Creditors
Under the Article 9 Report, the priority of claimants would be
determined on the basis of the time of recordation in either the
federal tract index or the federal notice-filing system.125 A pur-
chaser would then take title subject to an interest, including a
perfected security interest, recorded earlier in either federal system.
Furthermore, "[a] purchaser (including a secured party) who records
in the federal tract index would take free of (or take priority over)
a security interest that was perfected in accordance with Article 9
and not recorded in either federal system."126 Thus, while a filing
in either the federal tract index or under Article 9 would perfect a
lender's security interest, to have priority the lender must also
record in the federal notice-filing system. 127 On the other hand, the
Task Force Proposal provides that a secured party who files solely
under Article 9 will have priority over subsequent secured parties.
1 28
121 See supra part III.A.l.a.
12 ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101, at 51 (Recommendation C) (emphasis
added).
123 Id.
124 See Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 436 ("The Task Force believes that
perfection of security interests solely by an Article 9 filing ... is preferable to
allowing secured parties to choose between the federal and state filing.").
125 See ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101, at 51 (Recommendation D).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 55.
128 See Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 435. By way of other recommenda-
tions, the Committee's proposal encourages the revision of Article 9 and federal law
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d. Treatment of After-Acquired Property and Proceeds
The Article 9 Committee believes that the lender should be
allowed to file a single document encumbering all of a debtor's
after-acquired property and proceeds if agreed upon by the parties.
To accommodate this practice, the supplemental federal notice-
filing systems would be designed to "index the recorded documents
according to the name of the debtor, rather than according to the
particular property; [and] permit the filing of a single document to
affect rights in all of the debtor's property of the kind described,
including after-acquired property."12
B. Goals and Policies of Commercial Credit Law
1. Maximum Certainty
An examination of the proposals for reform must be guided by
the goals and policies of both commercial credit law and intellectual
property law. With respect to the use of intellectual property in
financing, the two major goals of credit law-maximum certainty and
minimum costs13 0-are not being met under the current legal
regime. To create certainty, the law should clearly indicate and
vigorously enforce the relationships intended to be created between
the parties involved in the financing. In intellectual property
financing, this means that the relationship between federal and state
law must be clarified such that the parties may know which body of
law controls in every aspect of a transaction.
Adoption of either the Task Force's or the Article 9 Committee's
proposal would lead to inconsistent law and certainty that is at best
superficial. State involvement necessarily implies state-to-state
variation: nearly all states have added, and undoubtedly will
continue to add, nonuniform amendments to their individual
versions of the UCC. Furthermore, the procedure of reforming
regarding enforcement of a secured party's rights upon the debtor's default. The
Committee recommends that Article 9 determine "the secured party's rights upon the
debtor's default but that federal law [should] determine[] the requirements for
making an effective transfer of the collateral in connection with the enforcement of
a security interest." ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101, at 51 (Recommendation E).
129 ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101, at 55.
'2 See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 51, at 195 (noting that "proper goals in
information asset financing are (1) to provide clearly articulated rules around which
transactions can be planned, and (2) to establish a system that minimizes the costs
and limits the risks in creating and maintaining interests in intellectual property").
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Article 9 would entail an extensive and drawn-out process of
enactment, with no assurance that the reforms would ever be
enacted in all states. 31
Given the prolonged UCC enactment process and the virtually
certain lack of national uniformity that would accompany Article 9
reforms, the mixed perfection approach cannot be said to meet the
goal of maximum certainty.
2. Minimal Costs
By eliminating the need for multiple filings for interests in after-
acquired property, both the Task Force Proposal and the Article 9
Report would provide a significant reduction in the costs associated
with using intellectual property as collateral in financing transac-
tions. Despite this reduction, both proposals would continue to
involve unnecessary expense by requiring a filing on both the state
and federal levels. Moreover, the Article 9 Report actually creates a
third filing system (the federal notice-filing system) which is
required in order to assure that a lender's rights are protected.
C. Goals and Policies of Federal Intellectual Property Regulation
Both the Task Force Proposal and the Article 9 Report are defective
because they fail to separate the structural issue of which body of
law should control from the policy issue of what the controlling
body of law should accomplish. Both proposals fail to recognize
strong federal interests in the area of intellectual property financ-
ing. Even in the absence of express statutory language from
Congress, federal regulation will preempt state law if the "federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." 3 2 The
1 It is seriously questionable whether a uniform system of state law could ever be
enacted. For example, in 1988, nearly twenty years after the 1972 Amendments to
Article 9 were released, Vermont, Missouri, and South Carolina continued to use the
1962 version of Article 9. See JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1 (3d ed. 1988). As early as 1967, approximately 775 nonuniform
amendments had been made by variousjurisdictions enacting the UCC. Article 9 was
the principal recipient of these amendments. See id. at 7.
152 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). When a
state law interferes or conflicts with the purposes and policies of federal intellectual
property law, it is preempted under the Supremacy Clause. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (holding that a Florida statute
prohibiting the use of reverse engineering to duplicate unpatented boat hulls conflicts
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mixed perfection approach fails to recognize the strong federal
interests regarding regulation of security interests in intellectual
property. The interests of the federal government are clearly strong
enough to require federal preemption of state regulation.
1. A Constitutional Mandate
The federal power to regulate copyrights and patents is derived
directly from a Constitutional mandate: "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
1 3 3
In exercising its power under this provision, Congress has
consistently sought to enact laws that encourage, facilitate, and
promote the "progress of science and useful arts." The modern
purpose of copyright law, for example, is to encourage the produc-
tion and dissemination of works of authorship. 3 4 Similarly,
patent law was established for the purpose of protecting the
development of new technology and encouraging its use.
1 3 5
with federal patent laws and is thus preempted); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (holding that an Illinois law giving relief against
copying unpatented industrial designs conflicts with federal patent laws and is thus
preempted); Nintendo, Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Copyright Act preempted any state law rights providing relief for
copyright infringement).
'3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"~ See PeterJaszi, Toward a Theoty of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship,"
1991 DuKE L.J. 455, 459 (noting the modern purpose of copyright law).
Early copyright law often incorporated the notion that the main purpose of
copyrightlaw was to reward the author for conceptualizing and producinga superior
work of art. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the
Supreme Court reflected this approach by extending copyright to photographs for the
first time. In finding that the photographer was an "author" for purposes of
copyright law, the Court felt it was important that the photograph was a "'useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that the plaintiff made the
[photograph]... entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave
visible form.'" Burrow-Giles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 60 (quoting the trial court).
Modern copyright law no longer gives credence to this approach. This position
was recently advanced by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991), in which the Court noted that the "primary objective
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.'" This conclusion reflects the current approach that the
purpose of copyright law is to encourage dissemination of valuable works.
" In adopting the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, the Senate reviewed
the purposes behind federal regulation of patents, stating:
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the states, within
their narrow limits, could give very little encouragement to inventors by
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Unlike copyrights and patents, trademark law does not derive its
power from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Instead,
Congress's power to regulate and develop trademark law rests on
the Commerce Clause."3 6 It is arguable that this somewhat limits
the scope of Congress's power when compared to the broad federal
powers available to regulate patents and copyrights. Nonetheless,
the express purpose of the Lanham Act is to provide a uniform and
comprehensive system of regulation of federally registered trade-
marks.'3 7 By providing such protection, the Lanham Act seeks to
secure the development and production of new products by
providing the manufacturer with a valuable method of marketing its
goods.
The same policies that inspired Congress to exercise federal
protection of intellectual property are implicated in devising a
scheme to regulate security interests in such property. It is clear
that there is a strong federal interest in maintaining a registration
system that continues to promote the growth, development, and use
grants of exclusive privileges ....
1. A considerable portion of all the [state-granted] patents [I are
worthless and void, as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another,
and upon public rights not subject to patent privileges ....
3. Out of this interference and collision of patents and privileges, a
great number of lawsuits arise, which are daily increasing in an alarming
degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to
society.
4. It opens the door to frauds, which have already become extensive
and serious.
Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 28, 1836),
reprinted in 6A DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENT-
ABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT app. at 12-2, 12-4 (1994).
Therefore, by removing the regulation of patents from the states, Congress
sought to encourage the development and use of new products by offering protection
previously unavailable under the differing state systems. These same policies are
implicated today in devising a scheme to regulate security interests in intellectual
property.
"16 For a brief overview of the history of federal trademark legislation, see EDMUND
W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS
250-53 (4th ed. rev. 1991).
..7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) ("The intent of this chapter is ... to protect
registered marks used in ... commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation.").
The functions of modern trademarks have expanded as the modern market has
evolved. They now include (1) an indication of origin, (2) a guarantee of quality, and
(3) a marketing and advertising device. See Reddy Communications v. Environmental
Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 944 (D.D.C. 1979).
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of intellectual property. In a modern economy, a company or
individual must often offer intellectual property as security in order
to obtain financing to enable the use of that intellectual property.
For example, inventors and businesses often require commercial
financing in order to produce a prototype of a new invention or
idea. However, those inventors or companies frequently will be
unable (or unwilling) to offer anything more than the intellectual
property itself as collateral to secure such financing. These same
issues arise when a company seeks financing to promote a new
product, or when an author needs financing to fund his creative
authorship.
Thus, there is a clear, strong federal interest in ensuring that
such financing is available. The purposes of the federal intellectual
property laws are frustrated when an author, inventor, or promoter
is unable to obtain such financing, or such financing is available
only at prohibitive costs. As the mixed approach would accomplish
these federal purposes with less efficiency and less certainty than a
wholly federal approach, 38 permitting the states to alter the
parties' rights conflicts with the purposes of the federal copyright
laws. Because the federal policy interests underlying intellectual
property would not be realized under a mixed approach to security
interests in such property, the mixed approach must be rejected.
2. A Federal Nexus
Adoption of the mixed approach to the regulation of security
interests in intellectual property would also fail to recognize the
nature of intellectual property rights themselves. The traditional
justifications for state regulation of property are not present when
dealing with federal intellectual property. Real estate, for example,
is an area in which the state retains an interest because the property
is physically located in the state. Indeed, one can say that real
estate is the state. Such is not the case with intellectual property.
Instead, it maintains its nexus with the federal government.
Intellectual property is a creature of federal law, is otherwise
regulated by federal law, and is located (ephemerally) in the federal
sphere. Thus, it maintains a nexus with the federal sphere that is
not enjoyed by any other form of property.
In a detailed opinion, the court in In re Peregrine Entertain-
ment' further examined the federal policy implications arising
13 See infra part IV.
139 National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re
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out of the employment of intellectual property in financing
transactions, focusing principally on copyrights. The court
determined that the "comprehensive scope of the federal Copyright
Act's recording provisions, along with the unique federal interests
they implicate, support the view that federal law preempts state
methods of perfecting security interests in copyrights." 4 ' The
court identified several policy issues influencing its decision,
including a copyright's "lack of an identifiable situs""' and the
preference for a uniform system of prioritizing claims.1 42  The
court also felt that the federal system better afforded interested
parties with "a specific place to look in order to discover with
certainty whether a particular interest has been transferred or
encumbered." 4 3 These policy concerns, along with the "voluntary
step back" provision144 of Article 9 which allows for federal
regulation, 45 led the court to conclude that perfection of security
interests in copyright can only be accomplished through filing in the
federal system.
In dicta, the court opined that these same interests mitigated in
favor of federal preemption in the area of patents. 46 The court
refused to extend the same deference to trademarks, however,
finding it particularly persuasive that "the Lanham Act's recordation
provision refers only to 'assignments' and contains no provision for
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
140 Id. at 199.
141 Id. at 201. Copyrights, patents, and trademarks are all fundamentally different
from tangible property, which exists at some physical location. This "lack of an
identifiable situs militates against individual state filings and in favor of a single,
national registration scheme." Id.
142 See id. at 202 ("The Copyright Act clearly... establish[es] a national system for
recording transfers of copyright interests, and [such recording] gives nationwide,
constructive notice to third parties of the recorded encumbrance.").
141 Id. at 200. The court explained:
To the extent there are competing recordation schemes, this lessens the
utility of each; when records are scattered in several filing units, potential
creditors must conduct several searches before they can be sure that the
property is not encumbered .... No useful purposes would be served...
if creditors were permitted to perfect security interests by filing with either
the Copyright Office or state offices.
Id. (citation omitted).
144 See supra note 41 (discussing the voluntary step back provision).
145 See In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. at 204 ("[T]he plain language
of... U.C.C. section 9-104... provides for the voluntary step back of Article Nine's
provisions 'to the extent [federal law] governs the rights of [the] parties.'" (quoting
U.C.C. § 9-104(a)) (emphasis and alterations added by the court)).
146 See id. at 204.
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the registration, recordation, or filing of instruments establishing
security interests in trademarks."'4 7 Although such an approach
may appear persuasive when comparing the Lanham Act to the
provisions of the Copyright Act, it is fundamentally flawed. Neither
the Lanham Act nor the Patent Act explicitly provides for security
interests or mortgages as the Copyright Act does.148  Because
similar policy concerns underlie copyrights, patents, and trade-
marks, they should be treated similarly. Furthermore, the current
state of confusion mandates a comprehensive system for perfecting
security interests for all types of intellectual property. These policy
concerns all favor a national federal registration scheme rather than
individual state filings.
IV. A WHOLLY FEDERAL APPROACH
It is clear that the mixed perfection approach does not ade-
quately further the goals of either intellectual property law or
commercial credit law. By contrast, a wholly federal approach, as
described and analyzed below, would achieve uniformity without
compromising the goals of either commercial credit law or federal
intellectual property law.
A. Goals and Policies of Commercial Credit Law
1. Maximum Certainty
To create maximum certainty, the law should clearly indicate
and enforce the relationships intended to be created between the
parties involved in the financing. In intellectual property financing,
this means that the relationship between federal and state law must
be clarified to indicate exactly which body of law controls in every
aspect of a transaction.
A wholly federal system would provide certainty by creating
absolute uniformity within the controlling body of law. Adopting
a federal systepn would require passage of legislation by a single
legislative body-Congress. Once federal legislation was enacted,
parties to an intellectual property financing transaction would be
assured of enjoying uniform rights throughout the country.
Congressional action is unquestionably needed to resolve the
141 Id. at 204 n.14.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67, 72.
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current confusion surrounding perfection of security interests in
intellectual property.149 Rather than deferring to individual state
law, the contents of which are unpredictable in advance, Congress
should enact a federal system to govern this area.
150
2. Minimal Costs
By offering a significant reduction in costs, a wholly federal
approach enjoys an important advantage over the mixed approach.
A wholly federal system, in which a single filing on the federal level
would be necessary and sufficient to establish perfection, clearly
would be less costly than the mixed approach, which requires filing
in two or three different systems. In a competitive market, such
savings will ultimately inure to the benefit of the borrowers.51
Reducing the costs a lender faces to perfect its security interest will
make intellectual property that much more valuable to borrowers.
B. Goals and Policies of Federal Intellectual Property Regulation
It is clear that there is an overwhelming federal interest in
maintaining a registration system that continues to promote the
growth, development, and use of intellectual property. The goals
of intellectual property are to promote the continuing progress of
science and the useful arts. Having clearer, more consistent
commercial credit laws increases the creation of, and investment in,
intellectual property. Thus, any policy increasing efficiency and
investment will also promote intellectual property.
149 Both the Article 9 Report and the Task Force Proposal recognize that an effective
solution requires modification of federal law. See ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 101,
at 50 (recommending that "federal law should be revised"); Task Force Proposal, supra
note 98, at 14 (stating "[i]t is also recommended that federal law ... be revised").
... As a further disincentive to deferring to state law, it should be noted that
"[Congress] might find it politically troublesome to specifically defer to state law
given the predictable, relatively long-term lack of statutory uniformity such a decision
would entail." Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 54, at 106 n.188.
151 In general, a decline in costs leads to an increase in output and a fall in price,
if all other things are held constant. See TERRY CALVANI & JOHN SIEGFRIED,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 36-37 (2d ed. 1988). Therefore, a decline
in the costs of intellectual property financing would lead to a benefit to borrowers,
the customers of the financing.
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C. Answering the Critics: A Response to Alleged
Disadvantages of a Wholly Federal System
Critics of the wholly federal approach allege that such a system
is flawed for several reasons. First, they contend that "for most
aspects of security interests in intellectual property law, there is no
strong policy interest supporting federal supremacy."'5 2 Following
this view, both the Task Force Proposal and the Article 9 Report
advocate a mixed approach in which all issues except title are
governed by state law. 153 Both proposals, however, fail to recog-
nize strong federal interests in promoting the use of intellectual
property in financing transactions.'54 Such interests transcend a
system of simply maintaining a record of the current titleholder.
Supporters of the mixed approach also criticize the wholly
federal approach as containing several practical difficulties. These
include the fact that the wholly federal approach would require a
complete revamping of the existing Copyright and Patent and
Trademark Office systems, procedures, and regulations to provide
for floating liens and elimination of look-back periods, along with
the establishment of a new set of priority rules.'55 This argument is
severely undermined, however, by the very proposals found in the
mixed approach. An essential requirement of the mixed approach
is that many of these very same changes be undertaken. Further-
more, after discussions with the relevant offices, the Task Force
believes that these changes are attainable.
56
A final concern of those opposing the wholly federal approach
is that enactment of a wholly federal system, the regulatory powers
of which will be expanded to include intellectual property financing,
will "federalize" state commercial law.'57 This would not be the
case, however, for using state law as a model for new federal law in
an area where federal law has always played a dominant role does
not mean that the state law is being "federalized." Rather, the
152 Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 431. This single conclusory statement is
the only reference to federal policy interests in the Task Force Proposal.
... See supra parts III.A.L.a, III.A.2.b (discussing the proposals of the Task Force
and Article 9 Committee, respectively).
" See supra part IIl.C (discussing federal interests).
.55 See Task Force Proposal, supra note 98, at 430-31.
" See id. at 435-37; see also supra text accompanying note 107.
... See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 54, at 102 (advocating an alternative
system that will avoid "federalizing" commercial law).
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approach is merely continued deference to the federal interests that
initiated the original federal regulation."'8
D. Contours of a Wholly Federal Registration System
A wholly federal registration system clearly offers significant
advantages over the mixed approach by providing greater certainty
and minimal costs while also giving necessary recognition to the
unique federal interests involved. Having established that federal
law should preempt state law in this area, the separate question
arises as to what this federal law should accomplish. 5 9 In this
regard, the Task Force Proposal and the Article 9 Report provide useful
direction as to the appropriate issues to be addressed.
The principal impediment to a federal system is the current
federal system itself. In light of the strong federal interests
implicated, and considering that federal law must be changed under
all proposals for reform, Congress should take this opportunity to
advance federal intellectual property law to deal with the needs of
modern financing. In order to adapt federal intellectual property
financing to the modern needs of lenders and borrowers, it is clear
that a system such as the current UCC is preferable to the current
federal system the principal emphasis of which is on title. There-
fore, a UCC-type financing system should be enacted and integrated
into the current Copyright and Patent and Trademark Offices.
160
Although this approach requires substantial federal reform, such
reform would also be required under the mixed approach.
16'
Furthermore, Congress would have the opportunity to create a
system that avoids many of the difficulties experienced in state UCC
160 See id.
159 The primary focus of this Comment is to resolve the debate as to whether
federal or state law should regulate security interests in intellectual property. The
analysis of this Comment has made it clear that federal law should control. The
details of substantive federal law that should be developed fall outside the scope of
this Comment. Therefore, this Part intends only to offer broad suggestions, drawing
upon the above analysis, as to what the substantive law of the federal law should
encompass.
60 This approach offers the further advantage of creating a federal system which
will be familiar to lenders from their experiences on the state level.
16 The Task Force Proposal and the Article 9 Report both require federal reform in
establishing a notice-filing system, eliminating or substantially reducing relate-back
periods, and allowing for blanket liens and encumbrance of after-acquired property.
See supra part III.A. Such reform thus seems inevitable and should be undertaken as
part of a federal system of law.
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filing offices. In essence, Congress could enact the best of the UCC
system.
The most substantial obstacle to reform is the current federal
tract-filing system. To allow for modern UCC-type intellectual
property financing, a federal notice-filing system would have to
allow for searches by debtor name in addition to the current system
of filing by individual property. Implementation of this system
would probably have to be accomplished through the creation of a
parallel-filing system.162 These start-up costs would appear to be
relatively modest.163 As suggested by the Task Force Proposal and
Article 9 Report, a federal system would also have to allow for the
filing of a single document to cover blanket liens and after-acquired
property and proceeds.16 1 It would further require the substantial
162 The current system, indexed by individual property, would need to be
maintained in order to continue to serve such purposes as determining whether a
trademark is already in use and federally registered and whether an invention is
potentially preempted.
It would be unnecessary, however, to maintain a parallel filing system for an
extended period of time. If documents filed with the federal offices were stored in
a medium such as CD-ROM, searches could be performed on any field, rather than
by the traditional index approach. Thus, a search by debtor name orby specific piece
of property could be accomplished through a single system.
The transformation to a CD-ROM-based system is already underway in the Patent
and Trademark Office. As part of an international sharing agreement between the
United States, Japan, and the European Union, databases encompassing complete
current and prior Patent and Trademark Office records are being created in CD-ROM
form. The United States expects to issue its version of the CD-ROM databases by
early 1996. SeeJPO's Patent Database Beats EU, U.S. in Sharing Agreement, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA) (Apr. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Allowing remote access to a federal collection of intellectual property records for
the purpose of performing due diligence searches could also serve to significantly
reduce the costs involved, both on the part of the lender performing the search and
on the respective federal offices that currently assist in such searches. Such efficiency
could be achieved through the use of current technology.
165 See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 54, at 98 ("The cost of establishing a
new filing system specifically designed to receive and maintain financing statements
... would seem relatively modest.").
' An ideal system for federal regulation of intellectual property as collateral
would allow for the single filing of a document on the federal level, encompassing all
rights in that property. For patents and copyrights, given that there are essentially
no common law or state rights left by virtue of federal legislation, federal perfection
alone would be sufficient. For trademarks, however, even if federally registered, such
a system would not provide complete protection. For example, if federal registration
of a trademark becomes abandoned because a particular document wasn't filed on
time or expires due to failure to be renewed, the federal regulation and the rights
associated with it are extinguished. The common law rights in the trademark,
however, are unaffected. Therefore, to be completely protected, a lender would also
need to file in the state-based UCC system. By contrast, if a copyright or patent
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reduction or elimination of the present relate-back periods. As the
Task Force noted after discussions with the relevant federal offices,
such modifications to the federal system are readily achievable.165
Furthermore, under a new federal system the legal status of lenders
should be clarified to eliminate exposure to ownership risks and
responsibilities such as infringement liability. These ownership risks
and responsibilities should remain with the actual owner of the
property. All of these modifications further the federal interests
involved.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property has become an increasingly valuable part
of business. As the United States moves forward into the "informa-
tion age," these assets will continue to rapidly increase in value. In
turn, the need to access these assets for financing purposes will
become increasingly imperative. Intellectual property's phenomenal
value and the ever-increasing awareness of the magnitude of that
value have combined to cast intellectual property in the dynamic
role as the dominating factor in commercial transactions for
decades to come.
166
As one commentator has noted, "[p]roblems in valuing,
measuring, and collateralizing intellectual property may exist, but
intellectual property's newly realized commercial value will
inevitably overcome such problems. There is simply too much
money at stake to permit continued ambiguity in the use of
intellectual property in commercial deals. "167
The time has come for enactment of a specific set of federal
laws to conclusively determine the rights of parties wishing to
employ intellectual property in financing transactions. Congress is
currently examining the suitability of a single system regulating
copyrights, trademarks, and patents. It should take this opportunity
to implement a unified federal system governing all financing in
intellectual property. 16  Only through a federal system can
expires or is otherwise invalidated, the federal rights are lost, and there is no
common law safety net. See KrrCH & PERLMAN, supra note 136, at 250 (discussing the
role of the common law in the protection of intellectual property and noting that
"[u]nlike patents and copyrights, ... [t]he common law remains today as a basic
source of protection for trademarks").
'6 See supra text accompanying note 107.
6 See Simensky, supra note 13, at 22.
1
67 Id.
"~ During the passage of the Copyright Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107
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maximum certainty and minimum costs be obtained, and the federal
interests in the continued growth, development and use of intellec-
tual property be realized.
Stat. 2304 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101), a provision calling for the reversal of
the National Peregrine decision was "dropped in order to study whether a single system
of recordation of transfers applicable to copyrights, trademarks, and patents should
be developed." 139 Cong. Rec. H10,308-02 (1993).
